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Abstract: The study uses panel data to investigate agency costs, 
both principal-agent (PA) and principal-principal (PP), in 240 
small businesses not listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
Results show that both forms of agency cost vary according to 
industry, the life of the business and size. The results indicate 
that the degree of owner involvement in the business influences 
firm PA and PP agency costs. Moreover, this study finds non-
linear relationship between agency costs and ownership structure 
align with convergence of interest hypothesis and managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis. It is noted that the distortion between 
equity returns and debt returns gives rise to a preference for quasi-
equity and distorts the productive base and effective pricing of 
risk. The analysis indicates there is considerable variability in 
the burden of agency cost and that this raises the potential for 
regulatory and policy reforms that may enhance the productivity 
and growth in the sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Aspects of agency cost have been researched for small and large listed companies, but 
unlisted small businesses, many of which are unincorporated, have received relatively less 
robust empirical analysis. “Although agency costs can affect both large and small firms, the 
initial separation between ownership and control typically occurs when firm is still small” 
(Danielson & Scott, 2007). Definitions for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) vary 
from country to country. In New Zealand, the Ministry of Economic Development (2007) 
defines SMEs as having less than twenty employees. In New Zealand, the number of SMEs 
increased by 2% between February 2006 and February 2007, and 2008’s statistics show 
SMEs represent 97.1% of all New Zealand businesses enterprises. As small businesses are 
important in most economies, contributing significantly to gross domestic product (GDP), 
employment and government taxation revenue, it is important to understand the agency 
cost issues related to SMEs.
In the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency theory, the zero agency-cost base case is, by 
definition, the firm owned solely by a single owner-manager. When management owns 
less than 100% of the firm’s equity, shareholders incur agency costs resulting from 
management’s shirking and perk consumption. Thus Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) zero 
agency cost base case is common in SMEs, due to most of the unincorporated businesses 
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being owned solely by a single-owner manager. Therefore, a traditional principal-
agent (PA) agency cost is not a significant issue for those single-owner manager small 
businesses. However, non-solely owned SMEs still have PA agency costs due to their 
level of separation. The absence of information about these unincorporated firms makes 
this problem worse. Instead of traditional PA agency costs, conflict between the majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders is a significant issue of small firms. This may 
be because owners of SMEs tend to hold considerable and undiversified equity position 
(Hewa-Wellalage & Locke, 2011). 
This paper presents PA and PP agency costs using a sample of New Zealand unlisted firms. 
Following Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) this study used an expense ratio and asset utilisation 
ratios, which are proxies for PA agency cost for small business. Small businesses may not 
pay dividends, and this is obviously true for unincorporated firms; therefore, dividend pay-
out ratio cannot be used as proxy for PP agency costs, which were used by Faccio, Lang 
and Young (2000) who measured PP agency cost for large firms. An income distribution 
metric is used as the PP agency costs proxy for this study. The SME sector is important and 
this study extends the current literature on agency costs into the smaller business group. 
The PP cost in particular has been articulated in the context of listed public companies 
in mature capital markets. The extent to which PP is applicable for small business is 
developed in this paper. Additionally, this research uses the recent dataset period in New 
Zealand, 1998-2008, whereas prior studies covered mostly US and UK firms and spanned 
only a few years. In particular, the adoption of the generalised method of moment (GMM) 
technique to control endogeneity effect on agency costs, provide robust results. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section is reporting prior research in literature, 
which points to several hypotheses. This is followed by a description of data, sample and 
variable measures. The method and empirical results are then presented. Implications and 
limitations are provided in the final section. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Costs associated with a lack of goal congruence between two parties were brought to the 
fore by Ross (1973) and were further explored by Jensen and Meckling (1976). These 
costs are often referred to as agency costs and can occur between a principal and agent and 
also between principal and principal. A PA problem arises when agents pursue their own 
goals rather than the goals of the principal. It is the result of conflicting interests among 
managers and owners and asymmetric information (Chrisman, Jess, Chua, & Litz, 2004). 
In many instances, agents will possess more or better information than the principals 
about strategic and operational decisions and the results of those decisions (Ross, 1973). 
A consequence of this divergence of knowledge about the firm is the potential for moral 
hazards and adverse selection to occur. 
The PP problem is best described in a firm with one large shareholder and a fringe of 
small shareholders (Villalonga & Amit, 2004). In such a firm, the traditional agency cost 
or PA conflict is alleviated due to the large shareholder’s greater incentive to monitor the 
manager. However, a second type of conflict emerges when large shareholders exercise 
their substantial control and influence over firm matters and, as agency theory suggests, 
they have incentives to consume the firm’s resources at the expense of the minority 
shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). It is important to note that the PP problem is 
more likely to overshadow the PA problem when the large shareholder is an individual or 
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a family, as opposed to an institution. This is because an individual or a family will have 
incentives for both expropriation and monitoring, with a potentially greater incentive for 
expropriation.
In the finance literature it is often assumed that equity agency costs are zero in a 100 
percent owner manager firms and equity agency costs increase with the separation of 
ownership and control (Fleming, Heaney, & McCosker, 2004). It is suggested that agency 
costs are inversely related to the proportion of ownership held by the primary owner 
(Ang et al., 2000). This argument is in line with Jensen’s (1993) convergence of interests 
hypothesis, stating that managerial shareholdings create the alignment of the interests of 
the owners and managers, and as the proportion of managerial equity ownership increases 
firm performance also increases. Ang et al. (2000) claim that the incentive to consume 
perquisites declines as a manager’s ownership share increases. They propose that because 
the manager’s share of the firm’s profits rises with ownership, managers will have less 
incentive to engage in non-value adding activities.
Chrisman et al. (2004) suggest that in small business where there is a conflict of interest 
between the owner and employee, theft and other forms of opportunistic behaviour may 
be present. This leads to PA agency costs in small business. As a solution of this problem, 
most of the small firms used owner-manager leadership that can effectively be used as 
a monitoring mechanism for small businesses. Using 68 SMEs in Norway, Randoy and 
Goel (2003) indicate that direct monitoring by owners is a guide to lower agency costs 
in small firms. This may be because small business owners usually invest their personal 
wealth into the business and business failure generates huge costs to them. Therefore, 
higher insider ownership is widely known to provide incentives to monitor management 
in small businesses. 
A non-linear relationship between agency costs and ownership concentration is another 
important issue in empirical analysis (McKnight & Weir, 2009). Park and Jang (2010) 
find that until the optimal break point is reached, convergence of interest with insider 
ownership increases firm performance and then managerial entrenchment decreases firm 
performance after the optimal point. Using the asset turnover ratio as proxy for PA agency 
costs, they find significant negative relationship with managerial entrenchment. This leads 
to the first hypothesis in this study:
H1a: There is significant negative relationship between the working owner ratio and PA 
agency costs in small businesses. 
H1b: PA agency costs will be higher at both the low and high percentages of working 
owner ratio.
Diversified shareholders will evaluate investments using rules that maximise the value of 
the firm’s residual cash flows (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), but larger individual shareholders 
may evaluate investments based on their needs, such as firm growth, technological 
innovation or firm survival, rather than attempting to maximise shareholder value. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain that the expropriation hypothesis predicts that the high 
level of concentrated ownership increases expropriation of majority shareholders from 
minority shareholders. In line with that, Carney and Gedajlovic (2002) find higher PP 
agency costs when ownership and control are concentrated in a few individuals or their 
family. More specifically, Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) explain that owner manager firm 
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control concentration does not increase firm performance, due to entrenchment problem 
persisting. Moreover, How, Verhoeven and Wu (2008) find that when the majority 
shareholders have control rights in excess of cash flow rights, they expropriate expenses 
of minority shareholders. This leads to a significant amount of tunnelling. However, in a 
recent study, Su, Xu and Phan (2008) find a non-linear relationship between the level of 
ownership concentration and PP conflict in the Chinese context. This may be because in 
small groups the controlling shareholders are generally involved in the firm’s management, 
which includes balancing the monitoring issues. In order to sustain external equity in the 
firm, the majority shareholders establish a good reputation for not expropriating the firm’s 
wealth (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000), thereby limiting PP agency 
conflicts. However, after certain level due to entrenchment PP agency costs can increase. 
This leads to the second hypothesis in this study:
H2a: There is a significant positive relationship between working owner ratio and PP 
agency costs in small businesses. 
H2b: PP agency costs will be higher at both low and high percentages of the working 
owner ratio.
In order to safeguard their loans, private creditors conduct extensive monitoring of firms 
(Ang et al., 2000). A bank for instance, has access to a firms’ non-public information and 
closely monitors the investment decisions of the firm (Anderson & Makhija, 1999). This 
monitoring leads firms to operate more efficiently by better utilising assets and limiting 
perk consumption, as the firm attempts to improve the reported financial performance to 
the bank (Ang et al., 2000). This bank monitoring complements shareholder monitoring 
of managers, and reduces agency costs incurred by the owner (Ang et al., 2000). The 
empirical evidence on U.S. firms seems to suggest that this is the case. For example, early 
evidence from James (1987 as cited in Anderson & Makhija 1999) and Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) reports that the performance of U.S. small firms responds favourably to 
announcements of bank financing. On the other hand, public creditors, such as bondholders, 
tend to have limited information about the firms’ investment opportunities, as they have 
limited ability to ensure managers are pursuing optimal investment policy. Because 
of this, a borrower has opportunities to act contrary to the interests of public creditors 
(Singh & Davidson, 2003). It is therefore reasonable to expect that firms with a larger 
proportion of public debt financing in their capital structure will have higher agency costs 
than firms with a higher proportion of monitored private debt financing. Small businesses 
rely predominantly on owner loans, i.e. quasi-equity, and bank loans. Where loans are 
small and they are processed using a credit score algorithm by the bank, there is likely 
to be almost zero monitoring to reduce agency costs. A third hypothesis (a) is formulated 
regarding PA agency costs and debt level of the small firms. 
H3a: PA agency costs will be higher as the debt level of the firm increases 
A growing number of studies find that the level of financial leverage has significant 
negative impact on firm PP agency costs (Al-Malkawi & Nizar, 2007; Faccio et al., 2000). 
Their findings are explained due to highly levered firms maintaining their internal cash 
flows to fulfil firm requirements, then controlling shareholders cannot expropriate firm 
wealth. Moreover, Jensen (1993) and Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) argue that because 
highly levered firms had greater commitments to their creditors, the excess funds available 
is reduced. However, Hamelin (2010) explains SMEs are sometimes financed by informed 
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minority shareholders, such as venture capitalists, and their monitoring ability of dominant 
shareholders is limited. Therefore, leverage does not have an ability to reduce majority 
shareholders extracting private benefits from firms. A third hypothesis (b) is formulated 
regarding PP agency costs and debt level of the small firms. 
H3b:  PP agency costs will be higher as the debt level of the firm increases 
EMPIRICAL TEST
Data and sample 
The sample of New Zealand unlisted small businesses, covering the period 1998-2008 
inclusive, was made available by the Management Research Centre at the University of 
Waikato. The data are collected annually in conjunction with the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants, as part of a financial benchmarking reporting programme, and 
the total series reaches back to 1982. The eleven-year period is chosen to ensure there 
are adequate businesses in the sample, as the data for earlier years becomes increasingly 
sparse nearer 1982. 
The random sample is drawn from accounting practices that prepare end of year financial 
returns for between 1000 small businesses each year. Following Ang et al. (2000), a zero 
equity benchmark is synthesised for sole proprietorship, removing those firms from the 
randomly generated sample. After adjustments, the dataset provides 2,640 observations 
from a total of 240 businesses appearing each year. Firms included in the study represent a 
range of industries categorised as primary, energy, goods, service and other.
Variables and measures
This investigation of PA and PP costs is based on financial data supplied by individual 
businesses and differs from previous studies of small businesses that drew on government 
surveys or bank-supplied data. Consistent with Ang et al. (2000) the first dependent 
variable for PA agency costs is the logarithm of expense ratio (LNOPEXL). This is defined 
as the ratio of operating expenses to annual sales. Operating expenses exclude the labour 
related expenses. The second dependent variable of this study is the logarithm of assets 
utilisation ratio (LNASSET). This is defined as the ratio of annual sales to total assets. 
Faccio et al. (2000) propose measuring PP costs using dividend pay-out. In the case of 
small businesses, dividends may not necessarily be appropriate; for example for a non-
company structured firm an alternative profit distribution metric is necessary. Therefore, 
the income distribution ratio (INCOME) is used as the third dependent variable of this 
study. This is defined as net income per working owner/ total sales. 
Independent variables are separated into three groups, relating to ownership structure 
variables, external monitoring variables and control variables. Three variables relating 
to the ownership structure are used. First, following Vos and Roulston (2008), the first 
ownership structure variable is the working owner ratio (OWNER). This measures the 
degree of owner involvement in the firm. The ratio is calculated as the number of full 
time equivalent working owners divided by total number of full time equivalent workers. 
Second, high working ownership (HIGH), this is a dummy variable = 1, when firm working 
ownership is greater than or equal 0.75 of all working staff. Third, no owner involvement 
(LOW) is a dummy variable = 1, when firm working ownership is equal 0. Debt-to-assets 
ratio (DEBT) is included as an external monitoring variable. This ratio is calculated as total 
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debt divided by total assets. Several additional control variables are taken into account, 
including firm size (LNSALES), which is measured by a natural logarithm of total sales; 
firm maturity (AGE), which is measured by the number of years operating in the industry; 
and industry effects for the five main industries: primary, energy, goods, services and 
others. These industries are represented by four dummy variables in the regression models. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the data and it is apparent that the variables 
are normally distributed, except age, which is transformed to log (AGE) in the analysis. 
The mean number of working owners percentage (OWNER) is 44.3%, and 23% of sample 
firms have a higher percentage of owners engaged in businesses. Only 0.6 percent of 
firms have no owners engaged in business. This sample confirms owner involvement is 
prominent in small business. The debt-to-assets ratio ranges from 0.86 to 36.04, indicating 
small businesses’ low reliance on debt. This study sample consists predominantly of young 
firms with 8 years as the average age and maturity range falls from 1 to 25 years. However, 
given the high churn over in small businesses, where in New Zealand 70% do not exist 
after 5 years, the mean of 8 years reflects solid going concerns. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
LNOPEXL 2640 -2.094913 -2.12846 .8022657 -4.494563 .2651079
LNASSET 2640 .8703738 0.938751 .9854159 -2.802817 12.66509
INCOME 2640 .130864 0.085387 .190495 -.3948126 3.232396
OWNER 2640 44.32244 33.33333 32.76039 0 100
HIGH 2640 .225 0 .4176614 0 1
LOW 2640 .0064394 0 .0800022 0 1
LNSALES 2640 13.43817 13.38354 1.34149 -2.802817 18.38514
DEBT 2640 .8658849 0.755117 1.490409 0 36.04424
AGE 2637 8.131968 8 3.992409 1 25
LNAGE 2637 1.939463 2.079442 .6208633 0 3.218876
INDUSTRY1 2640 .2041667 0 .4031677 0 1
INDUSTRY2 2640 .2 0 .4000758 0 1
INDUSTRY3 2640 .2 0 .4000758 0 1
INDUSTRY4 2640 .2 0 .4000758 0 1
INDCUTRY5 2640 .195833 0 .396916 0 1
Method
Panel data covering 11 years of variables for 240 businesses is prepared initially. Prior 
studies have used panel OLS to control heterogeneity over time and across firms. However, 
panel OLS requires that the independent variables are strictly orthogonal to the error 
term, and that these errors are independently and identically normally distributed with 
a mean of zero and variance equal to σ2. Singh and Davidson (2003) point out that it is 
reasonable to consider the ownership structure variables are determined endogenously. If 
the strict exogeneity condition fails, then panel OLS will be inconsistent. The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (DWH) test can be used as a diagnostic test for endogeneity of agency proxies 
and ownership structure variables. In the presence of endogeneity to obtain consistent and 
unbiased estimates, this study used a dynamic panel GMM estimator. 
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The analysis includes a Hansan/Sargan overidentification test for serial correlation to 
ensure this model specification validity. 
RESULTS
Though, most of prior studies ignored the endogeneity between insider ownership and 
agency costs, Singh and Davidson (2003) and Fleming et al. (2004) point out the possibility 
of endogeinety. The results of DWH revealed that ownership structure and all agency 
proxies have a significant endogeneity problem, suggesting a need to address the issue of 
potential endogeneity. 
Table 2: Dynamic panel GMM estimator regressions of PA agency costs
a Balanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level; This model 
provide standard error which are in parentheses
Table 2 addresses the issue of potential endogenity (by means of lag instrumental variables) 
and PA agency costs proxies. Column 2-4 and column 5-7 report expense ratio and assets 
utilisation ratio respectively. The analysis confirms that PA cost is correlated with several 
variables that have been observed in prior studies, but as noted above these are in some 
instances reflecting confounding results typically reflected by sign reversals. The coefficient 
of OWNER variable is negative and statistically significant at 1% level for both the expense 
ratio and assets utilisation ratio, indicating working owners reduce firm expenses as well as 
asset utilisation. Hence, this finding accepts H1a: There is significant negative relationship 
between the working owner ratio and PA agency costs in small businesses. 
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Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 2, the higher number of working owners(≥0.75) 
and zero number of working owners are significantly positively related to PA, indicating 
higher insider ownership increases management entrenchment problems, and lower 
insider ownership increases misalignment of the management and owners. Hence, this 
study finding accepts H1b: PA agency costs will be higher at both low and high percentage 
of working owner ratio. Debt-to-assets ratio is significantly positively related to both the 
firm expense ratio and assets utilisation ratio at the 1% level. Hence, this study finding 
accepts H3a: PA agency costs will be higher at higher debt levels of the firm. 
This suggests that at greater debt levels there is a larger expense version which included 
increased interest payments. Higher debt also appears to drive increased productivity 
through increased asset utilisation. Historical cost assets having low written down values 
while debt is at market value distorts the ratio and introduces an aging bias. Another 
distortion can occur due to quasi-equity in small businesses, where owners prefer to lend 
money to their businesses rather than buy more shares. The figures in Table 4 indicate 
that PA is related to industry type. Firm size is 1% significantly negatively correlated with 
PA, suggesting small firms have higher PA agency costs than larger firms. Firm age is 
significantly positively related to the assets utilisation ratio at the 1% level, indicating older 
firms have higher efficiency than younger firms. 
Table 3: Dynamic panel GMM estimator regressions of PP agency costs
a Balanced panel; * Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level;  
This model provide standard error which are in parentheses
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Table 3 reports the PP agency costs regression results. The coefficient of OWNER variable 
is positively and statistically significant at 1% level for the INCOME variable, indicating 
working owners increase firm PP agency costs. Hence, this study accepts H2a: There is 
significant positive relationship between the working owner ratio and PP agency costs in 
small businesses. 
Further, PP agency cost is significantly positively correlated with higher insider ownership 
group at the 1% level, indicating managerial entrenchment. Further, it is confirmed by 
lower insider ownership showing a significant negative relationship with PP agency costs 
at the 1% level. Hence, this study accepts H2b: PP agency costs will be higher at both low 
and high percentages of the working owner ratio. Intuitively, it seems likely that as a firm’s 
size grows it reduces the ability for expropriation by majority shareholders. Next, it is 
noted that industry factors play an important role, with some industries being more prone 
to PP costs than others, which is similar to the observation of Chrisman et al. (2004). As 
reported in Table 3, the maturity of the business is negatively correlated with PP cost. This 
suggests that longer-life businesses are not only profitable in a sustainability sense, but 
also exploitation by senior owner(s) is not so apparent. PP cost has a significant negative 
correlation with leverage. This leads to accepting H3b: PP agency costs will be higher at 
higher debt levels of the firm. 
As the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases, so too does the interest expense 
with associated demand on cash flow, and it appears this situation curtails the likelihood 
of a major owner diverting additional resources in his or her own direction. The Auto 
Regressive AR (1) and AR (2) tests report no serial correlation in order1 and order2 for 
all agency proxies. Therefore, there is no serial correlation in the original error, as desired. 
The second specification test is an overidentification test. The Hansan-Sargan J statistics 
are not significant under a 5 percent confidence level for three agency proxies, which mean 
that the instruments were valid.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The analysis provides the first robust empirical analysis of small businesses that are not 
stock exchange listed companies. Data availability is a significant issue and this impedes 
the research process in terms of exploring independent variables that might reasonably be 
expected to be available for listed public companies. The results presented above indicate 
that the degree of owner involvement in the business influences firm PA and PP agency 
costs. Moreover, this study finds that a non-linear relationship between agency costs and 
ownership structure align with the convergence of interest hypothesis and managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis. 
The analysis indicates there is considerable variability in the burden of agency cost and 
that this raises the potential for regulatory and policy reforms that may enhance the 
productivity and growth in the sector. The PP cost has received no prior consideration and 
this is of considerable importance based on the results. As the number of owner changes, 
the potential for one managing owner to expropriate the profit of other owners becomes 
more pronounced. The requirement for greater disclosure of financial reporting by all 
businesses, reducing opacity, will potentially reduce this distortion concerning the effective 
distribution of scarce capital resources. Due to highly concentrated ownership being more 
common in small firms, it is recommended to have legal and regulatory regimes that may 
act as mechanisms to protect minority shareholders, especially in the small firms context. 
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De Jure and de facto protection for creditors, investors and other related business parties 
need to be strengthened to avoid expropriation and tunnelling. 
Agency cost has two components, typically referred to as PA and PP, and these require 
separate consideration. First, it is important to remove any taxation incentivisation for 
financial engineering in the small business sector. The distortion between equity returns 
and debt returns gives rise to a preference for quasi-equity and distorts the productive base 
and effective pricing of risk. The common requirement for personal guarantees for business 
financing similarly distorts the operational efficiency as personal risk is not limited, and in 
the absence of a gambling mentality, risk taking is reduced. The results tend to be found in 
unnecessary overhead loadings with very high bankruptcy costs impounded into the cost 
of capital.
Results indicate firm debt has a significant impact on firm PA and PP agency costs. However, 
the debt issues for smaller businesses are problematic. First, the provision of finance from 
banks is likely to be mechanical, requiring personal guarantees and mortgage of family 
home as collateral. Second, to avoid lower ranking equity in case of failure, owners exhibit 
performance for quasi-equity. This distorts the productive base and effective pricing of 
risk. This finding shows that the increase of availability and accessibility of small firm 
finance can have a benefit of low PA and PP agency conflicts. 
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